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INTRODUCTION

Under Chicago’s Large Lots Program, existing property owners
can buy up to two vacant residential lots on their blocks for $1 each.
Lots are mapped on a website developed by DataMade, a civic tech
developer, and thereafter, buyers can transact seamlessly online.1 In
return, these new owners are required to pay property taxes and

*
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Michigan).
1. See Patrick Barry, Website Helps Residents Buy $1 Vacant Lots, LISC CHI.
(Apr. 4, 2014), http://archive.lisc-chicago.org/blog/9 [https://perma.cc/CZ95-PUYZ].
**

See generally The City of Chicago Sells Vacant Residential Lots for $1 through the
LARGE
LOTS,
https://largelots.org/
Large
Lot
Program,
[https://perma.cc/L83H-T6AV] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
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maintain the lot. This program is part of a larger effort by cities to
become “smarter” and more efficient through the use of civic
technology.2
Vacant lots are a ubiquitous feature of the urban landscape today
in all kinds of cities (and rural areas), notwithstanding the trend
towards urbanization.3 Catalyzed by racist policies like redlining and
blockbusting, many cities like Chicago and its suburbs are still
segregated by race and class.4 In large part because of “white flight”
to the suburbs and decades of disinvestment, many African American
communities (and other communities of color) could not afford to or
were legally restricted from living in high-opportunity areas.5 These
large population moves and historical disinvestment left behind
thousands of vacant lots in core Chicago neighborhoods, equivalent
to more than 800 acres of vacant land.6 Chicago is not unlike many
cities across the Rust Belt and the Northeast, where “[w]hat we refer
to now as ‘vacant land’ is the legacy of racial segregation, redlining,
and urban renewal, and more recently exacerbated by predatory
lending, the ensuing mortgage foreclosure crisis, and new
discriminatory practices in access to credit.”7
Today, local governments view the divestment and sale of vacant
or abandoned property as an economic necessity.8 They make
attempts to place the land back into productive use, usually by

2. See generally Barry, supra note 1.
3. Vacant land constitutes anywhere from 15–20% of older, so-called “legacy”
cities such as Philadelphia and Detroit, and consists of thousands of vacant lots which
are often concentrated together in a pattern of “hyper vacancy.” But even so-called
“magnet” cities — like New York, Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C. — have their fair share of vacancy, with rates ranging from 5–15%,
even as these cities experience unprecedented growth. ALLAN MALLACH, THE EMPTY
HOUSE NEXT DOOR: UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING VACANCY AND
HYPERVACANCY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 4–5, 25 (2018).
4. See Whet Moser, New Deal-Era Maps Show Racist Redlining and
Anti-Density
Forces
at
Work,
CHI.
MAG.
(Dec.
5,
2016),
https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/December-2016/Mapping-Inequality/
[https://perma.cc/S7Q5-SZUX].
5. See id.
6. Dimitriy Leksanov, Community Redevelopment, a Dollar at a Time, CHI.
MAROON
(Jan.
10,
2019),
https://www.chicagomaroon.com/article/2019/1/11/community-redevelopment-dollar-t
ime/ [https://perma.cc/G4DR-P4T4].
7. Amy Laura Cahn & Paula Z. Segal, You Can’t Common What You Can’t See:
Towards a Restorative Polycentrism in the Governance of Our Cities, 43 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 195, 201 (2016) (“For decades, municipal and private landowners have left
acres of land in neighborhoods . . . abandoned in cities across the Rust Belt and in the
Northeast.”)
8. See MALLACH, supra note 3, at 20.

2020]

FROM SMART CITIES TO CO-CITIES

911

acquiring title to these properties through tax foreclosures or placing
them in a land bank or public receivership until the title is clear for
transfer to private investors or developers.9 Chicago’s Large Lots
program, and similar programs, are another way of making sure land
is put back into productive use.
For residents in communities with significant amounts of vacant
land, these parcels are often treated as open access resources, and as a
community asset.10 There are many examples of residents utilizing
the lots in ways that add value to the surrounding community and
which produce goods for that community.11 The construction of
community gardens or urban farms is one example of this kind of
utilization.12 These resources become essential for the most socially
and economically vulnerable communities, as the “public” domain
shrinks and basic goods for human survival and flourishing are
increasingly out of reach for so many.13
While the benefits of selling vacant lots to existing property owners
are many, this Essay examines the limits of Chicago’s Large Lots
Program. In particular, it uses the Large Lots Program as a case study
to explore how local governments can address inequality through
different uses of urban vacant land in blighted communities. We
examine the program through the lens of the tension that exists
between “use” and “exchange” value in urban development. As John
Logan and Harvey Molotch framed it many decades ago, there has
long been a tension in urban markets and growth politics, between
local interests who treat land as a commodity for financial return, and
those who use land to satisfy the essential needs of everyday life14:

9. See id. at 37–38
10. See Sheila Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 281, 302–06 (2016).
11. Id.
12. Id. See generally Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban
Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 94–95 (2011).
13. See Bradley Garratt, The Privatization of Cities’ Public Spaces, GUARDIAN
(Aug.
4,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/aug/04/pops-privately-owned-public-space-ci
ties-direct-action [https://perma.cc/CCQ9-AG7D]; Tracy Jan, America’s Affordable
Housing Stock Dropped by 60 Percent between 2010 and 2016, WASH. POST (Oct. 23,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/10/23/americas-affordable-hous
ing-stock-dropped-by-60-percent-from-2010-to-2016/ [https://perma.cc/3D23-WAC8].
14. JOHN R. LOGAN & HENRY MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLACE 2 (1987) (“For some, places represent residence or production
site; for others, places represent a commodity for buying, selling, or renting to
someone else.”); see also Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a
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“The pursuit of exchange values in the city does not necessarily result
in the maximization of use values for others.
Indeed, the
simultaneous push for both goals is inherently contradictory and a
continuing source of tension, conflict, and irrational settlements.” 15
The tension between exchange and use value exists today at an
even more heightened level in large part because urban land values
are at historic highs. The total value of America’s urban land is
estimated to be $25 trillion, roughly more than double the nation’s
overall economic output or GDP.16 Nearly half the total value is
packed into just five metro areas: New York, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Washington, D.C., and Chicago, with land in and around
the urban center being the most valuable.17 The rising value of land
and resulting economic opportunity is concentrated in a relatively
small group of cities around the world, which has led urban scholars
to worry about “exclusionary megacities” and “property-centered”
urban development and growth that privilege developers, existing
property owners, and speculators to the detriment of non-property
owners.18
Chicago’s Large Lots Program arguably aspires to assuage this fear
by making urban land available for $1 to existing property owners
within the community where that land is located. However, what it
does not change are the underlying dynamics of an exclusionary
approach to urban land development that is characteristic of the cities
where economic opportunity is now so concentrated.19 The Large
Lots program operates, knowingly or unknowingly, to protect the
interests of existing property owners and to privilege their access to
available urban land in these communities. In doing so, the program
also facilitates the exclusion of individuals from opportunities ushered

Political Economy of Place, 8 AM. J. SOC. 309, 309 (1976) (“[L]and, the basic stuff of
place, is a market commodity providing wealth and power.”).
15. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 14, at 2.
16. David Albouy et al., Metropolitan Land Values, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 454,
454, 459 (2018); see also Richard Florida, The Staggering Value of Urban Land,
CITYLAB
(Nov.
2,
2017),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/11/the-staggering-value-of-urban-land/544706/
[https://perma.cc/UZV7-7P55].
17. Id. at 459.
18. See Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L.
REV. 467, 467–522 (2018).
19. See generally ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012); Mark
J. Perry, Many U.S. Metro Areas Have Greater GDP Than Entire Developed
Nations,
FOUND.
FOR
ECON.
EDUC.
(Oct.
2,
2018),
https://fee.org/articles/many-us-metro-areas-have-greater-gdp-than-entire-developednations/ [https://perma.cc/9WUZ-93WC].
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in by urban agglomeration, including access to resources within their
communities that can facilitate their ability to remain and thrive in
growing cities.20
In this Essay, we propose reforming programs like the Large Lots
Program consistent with a framework grounded in land stewardship,
in which land use is not dependent on ownership, or its market
exchange value, but rather on one’s (or a collective’s) ability to
sustainably use land to provide goods and services that support
adjacent communities.21 In particular, we look to the Co-City
Framework22, a new urban governance model based on the creation
and governance of shared and common resources arising out of the
collective action and active participation of urban communities in
stewarding land and other resources in their communities.23
According to the framework, common resources or goods occupy a
middle ground between public and private resources or property and
between the state and the market. These resources can be stewarded,
even in the absence of title, by an identified group of people or
community who are vested with the duty of maintaining and keeping
accessible (or affordable) the resource for future users and
generations. As we discuss below, property arrangements such as
community land trusts and limited equity cooperatives can be vehicles
for property stewardship consistent with the Co-City framework.
The Essay will proceed as follows. Part I offers background on the
Chicago program and some critiques that have been lodged against it.
Part II discusses an alternative to ownership-based public property
disposition: the Co-City Framework. Part III explores how the
Co-City Framework might apply to public property disposition in
Chicago, returning to how the Large Lots Program may be redesigned
to create and foster collective action and stewardship. Part IV
discusses the major challenges of stewarding land in cities with a high
cost of land and whose purpose of selling lots is to raise large sums to
finance their operations. To address these financial barriers, this Part

20. See Nicholas Blomley, Enclosure, Common Right, and the Property of the
Poor, 17 SOC. LEGAL STUD. 311, 311–31 (2008) (recognizing the right of the poor “not

to be excluded” from the property of the city).
21. See Foster & Iaione, supra note 10, at 307–08.
22. Id. at 345.
23. The model or framework of the Co-City is contained in the writings of Sheila
Foster and Christian Iaione, including their forthcoming book CO-CITIES (2021)
(MIT Press), their article, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281
(2016), and book chapter Ostrom in the City: Design Principles for the Urban
Commons, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE STUDY OF THE COMMONS (Dan Cole
et al. eds., 2019).
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explores three general strategies, which include creating incentives in
zoning and land use laws, encouraging the identification of alternative
financing sources, and launching strategic partnerships to build
leverageable assets. The Essay concludes by raising two policy
reform proposals that may further scale the Co-City approach.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE LARGE LOTS PROGRAM

In March 2014, community organizers in Chicago banded together
to propose that anyone who owned property on the block should be
able to purchase a vacant lot for a dollar.24 These organizers built
strong partnerships through a neighborhood coalition called the
Green Health Neighborhoods Plan.25 This coalition sought to
maximize community resources, such as vacant land, left behind by a
mass exodus from the City over the past half-century.26 Partner
organizations included the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for
Planning, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC Chicago),
and local officials.27
This effort came to be known as Chicago’s Large Lots Program, the
benefits of which are multifold.28 When cities transfer ownership of
large empty lots to existing property owners in the community, they
can repurpose the lots for better use. At least 1250 Chicago lots have
been sold through this program.29 Many empty, desolate lots, some of
which had been overrun with trash, sites of illegal dumpings, and stray
animals, have been transformed into gardens, housing, and public
parks.30 Better uses, in turn, might mean that the safety of the
communities in which these lots are located improves.31 These uses
also provide the kinds of goods and services that many disadvantaged
and marginalized communities, most often low-income communities
of color, often lack. These goods and services can include healthy
food and vegetables in neighborhoods that are food deserts and green
or recreational spaces where there are none.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Leksanov, supra note 6, at 3.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Sharita Forrest, Chicago’s Large Lot Program Sowing Change in Inner-City
ILL.
NEWS
BUREAU
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://news.illinois.edu/view/6367/764165 [https://perma.cc/XL2R-VL72].
29. Nona Tepper, The Collateral Damage of $1 Vacant Lots, CHI. MAG. (Nov. 19,
2018),
http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/November-2018/The-CollateralDamage-of-Large-Lots/ [https://perma.cc/WY2N-GKJJ].
30. Forrest, supra note 28.
31. Tepper, supra note 29.

Communities,
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To address concerns that new owners will simply purchase property
for speculative purposes, the Large Lots Program has two key
provisions.32 The first is that lots must be held for at least five years
to prevent flipping.33 The second is that only existing property
owners can purchase them, thus, in theory, preventing outside
investors from entering the market.34 Given the success of this
program, other cities are excited about adopting similar programs.
For instance, officials from Rochester, Kansas City, and New Orleans
have inquired about the program and indicated an interest in
adopting a similar one in their cities.35
Yet, despite its benefits, the Large Lots Program suffers from at
least two significant drawbacks. First, because the program is limited
to existing property owners, it forgoes the opportunity to expand
property ownership to residents who have not only lived in
communities but also have labored to maintain empty lots and to put
them to productive uses, as identified in the example of Luerlis
Gutierrez below. Second, while the program requires purchasers to
own property on the same block of the vacant lot, it does not appear
to require purchasers to live on that block.36 Based on our interviews
with city officials, the reason for the latter policy is that some
community members own their relative’s home in the neighborhood,
but do not live on the block where those properties are located, and
pushed to have access to the program. One unintended consequence
of this policy choice, however, is that developers and outside
speculators are purchasing multiple properties in the area, but
keeping lots empty.37

32. Barry, supra note 1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Robert Channik, 4,000 Vacant Lots on Sale for $1 to Chicago Homeowners,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Nov.
28,
2016),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-chicago-large-lots-expansion-1129-biz-20
161128-story.html [https://perma.cc/FRE4-E83X] (citing Peter Strazzabosco, the
Deputy Commissioner for Chicago).
36. Large
Lots
Program,
CHI.,
https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/large-lot-program.html
[https://perma.cc/39UX-HS2N] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020) (“Up to two lots are
available per application. Applicants must own property on the same block; be
current on property taxes; and have no financial obligations to the City, among other
requirements.”)
37. Leksanov, supra note 6 (“Developers who own properties throughout the city
have begun exploiting these parameters, creating a different kind of vacancy in which
absentee owners are the lots’ caretakers.”)
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Luerlis Gutierrez, for example, for years, would excitedly send
weekly pictures of her garden to her friends back home in Cuba,
showing blooming flowers and vegetation.38 Over the past decade,
she and a handful of local neighbors turned an abandoned lot near
their homes into a vibrant community named Fulton Garden. Today,
Fulton Garden has been destroyed, half of it fenced off and cluttered
with weeds and trash.39 The Large Lots Program sold half of
Gutierrez’s garden to a local property owner, who also owns three
properties in the neighborhood that have remained empty. Citing
liability concerns, this owner prevented Gutierrez from tending to the
garden.40 One Fulton Garden member commented, “It’s just like if
somebody comes in and takes your child away.”41 Chicago Magazine
also reported that change of ownership under the Large Lots
Program has destroyed at least two other community gardens, leaving
those lots vacant and harming the policy goals of the program.42
Purchases can thus rip apart community revitalization efforts, as was
the case of Gutierrez’s Fulton Garden.
To its credit, the City has recognized the risk of the program to
residents like Gutierrez. It has also recognized the labor of residents
like Gutierrez, who have transformed abandoned lots into productive
uses for the surrounding community. With assistance from local
community leaders, Chicago aldermen now place community gardens
on a “do not sell” list.43 Nevertheless, residents like Gutierrez believe
this effort is insufficient. Gutierrez argues that the lots for sale
through the Large Lots Program should be for residents who are
“sitting in the community, working with the community, engaging the
community.”44 A community-based leader involved with founding
the Large Lots Program agrees. Ivan Cazarin, who worked alongside
Teamwork Englewood and the City of Chicago, argues that the
emergence of owners of property next to vacant lots but who do not
live in the community “undermines the spirit of the program.”45 In
other words, both Gutierrez and Cazarin believe the Large Lots
Program should favor those who will steward the property for the

38. Tepper, supra note 29.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Online Interview with Ivan Cazarin, Chapter President, Roosevelt Inst. at
Univ. of Ill. at Chi. (Jan 21, 2020).
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community — instead of purchasers who happen to own property
locally.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE TO OWNERSHIP-BASED PUBLIC PROPERTY
DISPOSITION

Although an often-cited example of an alternative community
development model, Boston’s approach to vacant lots is instructive
for Chicago’s program. The Dudley Square area, located in the
Roxbury neighborhood of South Boston, was once one of the poorest
areas in the Boston metropolitan area with numerous vacant and
tax-defaulted lots, much like the lots sold pursuant to Chicago’s Large
Lots Program.46 Through the 1970s, the Dudley neighborhood
deteriorated due to white flight and the neglect and divestment of
Boston-area government officials and financial institutions.47 By the
1980s, over one-fifth of the neighborhood’s land was vacant. Those
that remained were largely impoverished Hispanics, African
Americans, Jews, and other minority groups, which did not have the
financial option to relocate. But instead of selling these lots to local
property owners, the City of Boston transferred ownership of 15 acres
— about 1300 lots — to a community land trust (CLT).48 Dudley
Square residents incorporated as a nonprofit (Dudley Square
Neighborhood Initiative, or DSNI) and embarked on an ambitious
plan to create an “urban village” that would develop the
neighborhood without resulting in the displacement of existing
residents.
On the once-vacant land, the Dudley Neighbors
community land trust built 225 new affordable homes, a 10,000 square
foot community greenhouse, an urban farm, a playground, gardens
(which today total more than 70), and a variety of other amenities.49

46. Housing Brass Tacks: Community Land Trusts, URB. OMNIBUS (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://urbanomnibus.net/2018/01/community-land-trusts/
[https://perma.cc/R9PF-Q77Y].
47. See generally PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREET OF HOPE: THE FALL
AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (1994).
48. To do this, DSNI, along with its community partners, approached the Boston
Redevelopment Authority and requested eminent domain authority, which was
granted by the City of Boston. This was due, in large part, to the support they
received from the newly elected Mayor of Boston, Ray Flynn. With this authority, the
DSNI purchased 60 acres of vacant land in the neighborhood, an area called the
“Dudley Triangle,” and created a community land trust to ensure and preserve its
affordability and prevent it from being captured by private developers. Id.
49. Jake Blumgart, Affordable Housing’s Forever Solution, NEXT CITY (Aug. 10,
2015),
https://nextcity.org/features/view/affordable-housings-forever-solution
[https://perma.cc/D586-855S]. The housing now includes 77 cooperative living
quarters, 55 rental apartments, and 96 individually owned homes. Individuals or
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The Dudley Street CLT is one among a number of emerging CLTs
across the country, largely to provide affordable housing but also
other affordable community amenities and goods.50 A CLT is a
nonprofit entity that owns the land and leases it for what it deems
CLTs operate most uniquely as
community-beneficial uses.51
stewards of shared resources by removing land from the speculative
market and separating land ownership from land use.52 Through
lease agreements, CLTs allow more residents to benefit from the
land.53 For instance, CLTs often impose a resale formula tied to
inflation as a condition of leasing land from the CLT, thus limiting the
speculative potential of land.54 Through such resale formulas, CLTs
keep this land affordable and accessible to future generations.
A critical component of a CLT is its efforts to promote democratic
governance, a key component of land stewardship and community
control of land. The governing board of a CLT is typically
“tripartite” — an equal number of seats represented by users or
people who lease the land from the CLT, residents from the
surrounding community who do not lease land from the CLT, and the
public and private sector (usually public officials, local funders,
non-profit providers of housing or social services, and others).55 The

families who wish to purchase one of Dudley’s affordable homes participate in a
lottery system in order to ensure equal and fair access to the homes that come
available. And once purchased, the homeowner pays a small lease fee for the land
that the house sits upon, which continues to be owned by the CLT. The homeowner
also agrees that if the home is ever sold, which is rare in the Dudley area, that the
home must be sold at a cost determined by the formula used by DSNI’s CLT. This
information was based on independent research and an interview with Mr. Juan
Leyton, a leader in DSNI. Telephone Interview with Juan Leyton, Former Exec. Dir.,
Dudley St. Neighborhood Initiative (May 18, 2018).
50. See, e.g., Models and Best Practices: Community Land Trusts (CLTs),
https://community-wealth.org/strategies/panel/clts/
COMMUNITY-WEALTH.ORG,
models.html [https://perma.cc/5TAS-A3MM] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
51. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, BURLINGTON ASSOCS. IN CMTY. DEV., STARTING A
COMMUNITY LAND TRUST: ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHOICES (2007),
https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/toolburlington-startingCLT.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT2K-DCU7].
52. See generally John Davis, Common Ground: Community-Owned Land as a
Platform for Equitable and Sustainable Development, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2017).
53. See Emily Thaden, The State of Shared-Equity Homeownership,
SHELTERFORCE (May 7, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/05/07/shared-equity/
[https://perma.cc/2TP9-NYLJ].
54. See generally GROUNDED SOLUTIONS, RESALE FORMULA DESIGN (2011),
https://groundedsolutions.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/12-Resale-Formula-Design.p
df [https://perma.cc/A5RU-GCKE].
55. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, COMMON GROUND: COMMUNITY LED DEVELOPMENT
ON COMMUNITY OWNED LAND, ROOTS & BRANCHES 5 (2015).
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governance structure of the typical CLT thus differs from the kind of
closed, private governance of condos, co-ops, and other “common
interest communities,” whose boards consist only of private property
owners.56 CLTs transform what might otherwise be a collection of
individuals owning property, as in a traditional condominium or
housing cooperative, into a collaboratively governed nonprofit
institution that stewards land and creates essential community goods
in a way that ensures their long-term affordability and access for
those vulnerable to being priced or urban areas today.
For example, Dudley Square’s CLT board is represented by local
and nearby residents who enforce lease agreements and other
obligations of the lessors.57 The board is organized and run so that
each cultural or ethnic grouping present in the Dudley community
gets an equal voice.58 The Board has 35 seats, and of those 35, 20 are
reserved for community residents, including an equal number of
representatives of the four main ethnic groups inside the
community.59 Residents alone vote for who gets to serve the two-year
board term.60 Campaigns are door-to-door and face-to-face so that
all residents get the opportunity to meet the members of their
board.61 Once elected, the Board approves all decisions made by
DSNI.62 All projects and campaigns have to be vetted and approved
by the Board, but such decisions are always open to community input
and participation.63
CLTs resonate with what property scholars refer to as “governance
property.”64 Governance property characterizes many (if not most)

56. See generally Meagan M. Ehlenz, Community Land Trusts and Limited
Equity Cooperatives: A Marriage of Affordable Homeownership Models? (Lincoln

Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WP14ME1, 2014).
57. Telephone Interview with Juan Leyton, supra note 49.
58. Id.
59. Of the 20 community seats, four seats are for Black residents, four are for
Latinos, four are for residents with a Cape Verde heritage, four are for white
residents, and four are for youth (ages 15–18) living in the community. Of the
remaining seats: two are for community development organizations, two for local
religious organizations, seven for partner organizations, and two for small businesses
in the community. Once in place, these 33 members then elect two additional
members from those who wanted to participate on the board but were not elected,
for a total of 35. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 1853 (2012).
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forms of private property ownership today in that such property is
shared with multiple owners or users collectively making governance
decisions about access, use, enjoyment, and transfer of property.65
CLTs are a departure from the prevailing property ownership model,
characteristic of Western legal culture, which aggregates all legal
rights and entitlements in one owner.66 As property scholars have
begun to recognize, the dominant Western model of property and
resource ownership — the “fee simple”67 — looks more and more
ill-fitting for the urbanized, interdependent world in which most
people live.68 Endowing owners (public or private) with a monopoly
on urban land and resources, this form of legal ownership “misses
most of how urban property creates value,” namely through spatial
relationships that result from the density and proximity characteristic
of urbanization.69
To meet the demands of contemporary urban land use instead
requires a mix of approaches to mediate access to resources,
particularly for those who have much less of them. It requires, at the
very least, embracing approaches that recognize relational property
interests and resource governance in ways that advance access to
urban resources for the most vulnerable and marginalized
communities facing resource uncertainty and precarity. Gaining or
retaining access to these resources often involves a struggle or effort
to recognize something akin to a collective property right to those
resources for the urban poor.70 This is why we propose that cities like
Chicago, where economic opportunities are concentrated, and urban
land values are skyrocketing, encourage land and resource
stewardship in urban communities. Such an approach, which lies at
the heart of the Co-City framework, suggests that it is possible to
adapt and unbundle the legal entitlements to access71 and use
property to satisfy normative commitments to social inclusion and
distributive justice embraced by cities like Chicago.

65. Id. at 1856.
66. See generally Lee Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457
(2016).
67. “An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law,
endures until the current holder dies without heirs.” Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
68. See generally Alexander, supra note 64.
69. Fennell, supra note 66, at 1459–61.
70. Blomley, supra note 20, at 311.
71. See generally Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks, 32 ENVTL.
L. 773, 789–91 (2002).
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Drawing from Elinor Ostrom’s work on collective governance of
shared or common resources, the Co-City Framework argues that
residents should be able to use space, generate resources, and thrive,
using urban land and resources that are available in their
communities.72 The Co-Cities project, for example, is mapping
examples from cities all over the world of the various ways that
communities and users are co-managing and co-governing shared
urban resources in different geographic, social and economic
contexts.73 CLTs are one way that cities all over the world are
experimenting with to ensure that critical urban resources remain
accessible to individuals and communities by adapting private
property entitlements to allow for resource stewardship.74 As Lisa
Alexander has written, property stewardship is created by removing
the profit motive and by allocating rights and responsibilities in a way
that gives stewards decision-making control over resources in a
manner similar to ownership, but without the emphasis on sole
dominion and the individual exchange value of property.75 A
resource stewardship framework grants control of, and access to,
resources without formal “fee simple” title, without wealth
maximization as a goal of property access, and “connects stewards to
economic resources and social networks that maximize their
self-actualization, privacy, human flourishing, and community
participation.”76
Other often used tools in the Co-City Framework, aside from
community land trusts, include limited equity cooperatives (LECs).
Much like CLTs, LECs also impose resale restrictions on interests. In
places like Washington, D.C., residents in long-term rental buildings
have transformed their rental buildings into LECs to allow residents
to remain in their communities as those neighborhoods undergo

72. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public
Economies (United Nations Univ., World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Working

Paper No. DP2005/01, 2005).
73. What
Is
a
Co-City,
LABGOV,
http://commoning.city/
[https://perma.cc/Q9UE-XRLY] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020). To date, the project has
surveyed over 180 cities and over 500 policies and projects within them. Id.
74. See, e.g., John Krinsky & Paula Z. Segal, Stewarding the City as Commons:
Parks Conservancies and Community Land Trusts, 22 CUNY L. REV. 270, 282–83
(2019) (suggesting that CLTs “largely fulfill the demands of most of Ostrom’s design
principles” for collectively managed common pool resources).
75. Lisa Alexander, Community in Property: Lessons from Tiny Homes Villages,
104 MINN. L. REV. 385, 402 (2019).
76. Id. at 443.
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gentrification.77 For years, tenants across that city worked together to
fight threatened evictions, pool their money to purchase their
apartment buildings, and exercise control over the increasingly scarce
resource of affordable housing.78 To ensure the affordability of these
buildings for future low- and moderate-income persons, the current
residents created limited equity cooperative ownership structures.
This allowed apartment dwellers to purchase shares in the co-op for
little money, to pay low monthly co-op fees, and then to sell their
shares for the same amount that they bought it plus a small amount of
interest.
Unlike CLTs, however, the mechanism to keep land uses
affordable in an LEC occurs through a cooperative agreement
restricting resale values, rather than a lease or deed restriction
imposed by a nonprofit trust.79 Because LECs are a common or
cooperative ownership regime, residents can rewrite the cooperative
agreement and make private gains from speculation, as occurred in
the hundreds of cooperative agreements in New York City (NYC)
that converted to market-rate units.80 CLTs represent something
quite distinct: a form of ownership for the common good in that the
trust is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that allows community
control over land through a democratic governance structure. The
trust, as indicated above, is typically governed by residents in the
surrounding community, leaseholders using the land on top of the
trust, and the general public (represented by other stakeholders).81

77. See generally COAL. FOR NONPROFIT HOUS. & ECON. DEV., A STUDY OF
LIMITED-EQUITY COOPERATIVES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2004),
https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/repo
rt-cnhed.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3VH-UF3Z].
78. See generally AMANDA HURON, CARVING OUT THE COMMONS: TENANT
ORGANIZING AND HOUSING COOPERATIVES IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2018).
79. Benjamin Schneider, CityLab University: Shared-Equity Homeownership,
CITYLAB
(Apr.
29,
2019),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/04/home-ownership-ideas-housing-co-ops-share
d-equity-land-trust/585658/ [https://perma.cc/2PR9-X2LG].
80. See generally infra note 160.
81. Although not all land trusts operate like this. As a recent analysis has
demonstrated, some land trusts are not about community control at all but rather
chiefly about promoting individual homeownership. They lack the tripartite
governance structure that has historically been one of the defining characteristics of
land trusts. James DeFilippis et al., W(h)ither the Community in Community Land
Trusts?, 40 J. URB. AFF. 755, 764 (2018) (noting that there is nothing inherent in the
CLT model that requires a focus on housing and that. CLT land can be used for
whatever purpose a community deems appropriate including, for example,
development of housing, commercial space, industry, community and nonprofit
centers, gardens, and parkland).
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III. LAND STEWARDSHIP IN CHICAGO

What does the above analysis mean for the Large Lots Program?
Can administrators find or cultivate a CLT or LEC to steward a set of
plots? If not, might administrators sell to local residents, who intend
to use it for community-beneficial uses? Fortunately, Chicago
already has experience with using land trusts to enable communities
to steward land sustainably in a way that meets their needs and allows
residents to benefit from any new development that comes into the
neighborhood. For instance, NeighborSpace is an independent,
nonprofit land trust that preserves urban land, throughout the City of
Chicago, for community gardens and open space. Created in 1996 by
three government entities — the City of Chicago, the Chicago Park
District, and the Forest Preserve District of Cook County —
NeighborSpace now oversees 115 land-based sites located in 33 wards
across the city, many of which are involved in community gardening
projects.82
NeighborSpace is unique among urban land trusts because it
represents the kind of “nested” and multilevel governance structure
that Elinor Ostrom found was often present in the community
management of large-scale common pool natural resources.83 She
documented the success of human communities that rely on natural
resources to construct “institutions resembling neither the state nor
the market to govern some resource systems with reasonable degrees
In these instances,
of success over long periods of time.”84
communities governed these resources through collaborative
arrangements in which participants collectively decide how to
produce value for the users and communities in which those resource
are located. These structures are critical for managing shared
resources at a complex scale, like the city. In these structures,
self-organized small groups of users acting relatively autonomously
but within a federated system that links them together.
In the case of NeighborSpace, once a land grant is established, the
government generally relinquishes operational control to the land
trust, which itself transfers most of that control to the local gardeners

82. See generally Community-Managed Open Space, NEIGHBORSPACE,
http://neighbor-space.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ86-49TG] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
83. Elinor Ostrom & Marco A. Janssen, Multi-Level Governance and Resilience
of Social-Ecological Systems, in GLOBALISATION, POVERTY, AND CONFLICT: A
“CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT” READER 250 (Springer Netherlands ed., 2005).
84. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 1 (1990).
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and community groups that act as “stewards” over the land.85 In
effect, NeighborSpace operates as a higher-level authority, while the
real control and management over day-to-day affairs are handled by
local members and groups in the community where the land is
located.86 The rules of the land trust require collective governance
over the acquired plots, which are prohibited from having a single
lead gardener or overseer but must have multiple leaders overseeing
its development, as well as community support and buy-in.
By transferring multiple plots to CLTs at once, administering this
program can still efficiently scale. Boston took this approach when it
transferred 1300 lots to the Dudley Square Community Land Trust.
If there are not enough trusts, Chicago could develop more of them,
just as NYC is doing under the de Blasio administration.87 NYC
secured funding from Enterprise Community Partners to develop a
variety of CLT projects.88 In late 2017, the City Council officially
codified CLTs into law, allowing the city departments, such as the
Department of Housing Preservation and Development, to enter into
agreements with them.89 This legal recognition thus opened the way
for the city to sell vacant public lots to CLTs.

85. Telephone Interview with Ben Helphand, Exec. Dir., Neighborspace (Apr. 18,
2018);
see
also
NEIGHBORSPACE,
http://neighbor-space.org/
[https://perma.cc/B4Q7-KVR8] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
86. NeighborSpace, the land trust, handles the land purchases, performs
environmental assessments and title work, holds the titles, easements or leases that it
acquires, provides liability insurance and legal defense, and works to secure a
dedicated water line for every parcel of land that it obtains. Nina Ignaczak, Chicago’s

NeighborSpace Preservers Urban Land in the City for Community Gardens and
Open
Space,
SEEDSTOCK
(Sept.
10,
2013),

http://seedstock.com/2013/09/10/chicagos-neighborspace-preserves-urban-land-in-thecity-for-community-gardens-and-open-space/ [https://perma.cc/NQB3-FM65]. It also
provides some guidance and other forms of support, “including a signage template, a
list of gardeners’ rights and responsibilities, and a tool lending library,” and it acts as
the liaison between the government and the participating community groups. Id.
However, it is not involved in the day-to-day management of the land plots, which is
left to the community, and plot users, in what is described as a “non-hierarchical”
governance structure that prevents the centralization of power in any one individual’s
(or one group’s) hands. Telephone Interview with Ben Helphand, supra note 85.
87. Abigail Savitch-Lew, The NYC Community Land Trust Movement Want to
Go
Big,
CITYLIMITS
(Jan.
8,
2018),
https://citylimits.org/2018/01/08/the-nyc-community-land-trust-movement-wants-to-go
-big/ [https://perma.cc/B46H-R97K].
88. Press Release, NY Attorney General, Attorney General James Announces $8
Million in Grants to Fund Affordable Housing (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-8-million-gran
ts-fund-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc/QGV2-YKVT].
89. Savitch-Lew, supra note 87.
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Similarly, many prominent German cities have explicitly formed
incubators for cooperatives.90 The city of Leipzig, for instance,
provides not only free financial consultations but also connects
vulnerable segments of the population with each other so they can
form housing cooperatives. For example, Leipzig’s Network for
Multigenerational Living helps families and seniors form
multigenerational housing cooperatives and learn from best practices
from prior housing cooperative entrepreneurs.91 Munich, as another
example, not only favors cooperative housing in its land sales but
incentivizes them. It offers 20–40% of city-owned land at reduced
prices to cooperative housing groups, viewing them as critical
partners in the creation of permanently affordable housing.92 For
cooperatives that meet additional social purpose goals, the city of
Munich also reduces borrowing costs for these developers.93
One may argue that incorporating these conditions will harm the
demand for lots in the Large Lots Program. Yet, already 1250 lots
have been sold in just five years.94 Having validated demand for
these lots, the City of Chicago can now afford to ensure that lot sales
drive the city’s long-term goals forward. A stewardship-based
proposal would not even be radical in the context of Chicago’s policy
framework. In fact, it formalizes an existing process. Before
Gutierrez’s lot was sold by the Large Lots Program, a local alderman
representing her supported transferring ownership of the garden to a
local community land trust. Because there was no formal process to
include the transfer of ownership to a CLT, however, “wires were
crossed,” and the Large Lots Program administrators did not transfer
ownership to a CLT.
Community leaders argue that a stewardship-based model could
address scenarios like Gutierrez’s “by empowering residents and
community members with the agency to execute decisions over land

90. Kathryn Reynolds, Lessons from Germany’s Shared Housing Models:
Expanding Ownership Opportunities and Improving the Built Environment,
MATTERS
(Nov.
14,
2018),
HOUSING
https://housingmatters.urban.org/articles/lessons-germanys-shared-housing-models-ex
panding-ownership-opportunities-and-improving [https://perma.cc/MY9W-YT5D].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Daniel Wu, Are Community Land Trusts the Answer to Chicago’s Large Lots
Program
Issues?,
SHAREABLE
(Dec.
10,
2019),
https://www.shareable.net/are-community-land-trusts-the-answer-to-chicagos-large-lo
ts-program-issues/ [https://perma.cc/8XU2-PBEX].
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use, democratically.”95 Indeed, the Co-City Framework’s toolkit of
CLTs and LECs may better match the purposes that are driving key
community leaders who created the program with the City of
Chicago. As we saw in Boston’s Dudley Square CLT, when applied
to public land sales, a stewardship framework promotes principles of
justice, solidarity, and deep collaboration in its work to ensure that
cities are not constructed by a select few property owners, and instead
meet the needs of all. When more residents benefit from their use of
land, cities unleash the creativity of their residents. Cross-cutting
relationships are built, communities thrive, and sustainable economies
develop. A stewardship approach to putting vacant land back into
productive use for urban communities can unlock what Ostrom called
“public entrepreneurship” — opening the public sector to innovation
in providing, producing, and encouraging the co-production of
essential goods and services at the local level without privatizing
those goods.96 Cities can support communities’ productive use of
available urban assets, like land, providing them with the necessary
tools to become empowered agents in the regeneration of their
neighborhoods. These tools include public policies, program policies
like the Large Lot Program, support of community land trusts, and
fostering connections between active networks such as community
gardeners across a city, just as NeighborSpace does.
IV. SUPPORTING AND FINANCING URBAN LAND STEWARDSHIP: A
CHALLENGE TO SCALING THE CO-CITY APPROACH

With the goal of revitalizing neighborhoods with vacant lots,
dozens of cities and countries are administering schemes reminiscent
of Chicago’s Large Lots Program, including New York,97
Philadelphia,98 Dallas,99 and Spain.100 Other cities, like Detroit, have
95. Online Interview with Ivan Cazarin, supra note 45.
96. Elinor Ostrom, Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public Economies
(UNU World Inst. for Dev. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2005/01, 2005),
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/dp2005-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3WH-Q8QH].
97. Hannah Frishberg, New Map Shows Every City-Owned Lot Sold for $1 since
De Blasio Became Mayor, CURBED N.Y. (Mar. 13, 2018, 2:00 PM)
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/3/13/17115052/new-york-city-owned-land-lots-interactivemap [https://perma.cc/E8EH-XAKD].
98. Jake Blumgart, City Selling Vacant Lots with Eye to ‘Social Impact’, PLAN
PHILLY
(Nov.
29,
2018),
https://whyy.org/articles/city-selling-vacant-lots-with-eye-to-social-impact/
[https://perma.cc/HTA9-JYC7].
99. Julieta Chiquillo, From Empty Lots to Affordable Homes: Dallas Vows to
Clean up its Act After Investigation Found Abuse, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 10,
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independent land banks manage vacant parcels, clear title, and sell
the land back to private owners.101
The temptation, and challenge, for cities with available, vacant, or
unutilized land is that such land is one of the few vehicles many cities
have to generate additional revenue. Hong Kong, for instance, sells
its high-demand vacant lots to the highest bidder for hundreds of
millions or even billions,102 thereby funding local city operations.103
Local city governments in the United Kingdom have sold over 12,000
public libraries, universities, parks, and other public spaces to private
owners to garner funds, after years of central government austerity.104
More drastically, countries like Honduras are creating “charter
cities.”105 They sell not only lots of vacant land to private developers
for millions, but also contract out the legal regime to govern related
civil and criminal matters through an independent commission.106
Even if city administrators around the world agree to consider
selling vacant land to a CLT before private owners, these nonprofit
entities may struggle to finance the development of the land into
community assets and to sustain them as affordable.107 CLTs and
LECs have struggled to access financing for blanket mortgages or
2018), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2018/01/11/from-empty-lots-to-affordablehomes-dallas-vows-to-clean-up-its-act-after-investigation-found-abuse/#_ga=2.742875
05.204471389.1582764918-200505527.1582764918 [https://perma.cc/8G8S-LNE8].
100. Lauren Frayer, In Spain, Entire Villages Are Up for Sale — And They’re
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Aug.
23,
2015),
Going
Cheap,
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/08/23/433228503/in-spain-entire-villages-a
re-up-for-sale-and-theyre-going-cheap [https://perma.cc/2J6H-UADB].
101. John Gallagher, Detroit Land Bank Admits Faults, Carries on Amid
Complaints It Moves Too Slowly, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.freep.com/story/money/business/john-gallagher/2019/12/03/detroit-land-b
ank-criticism-weve-accomplished-tremendous-amount/2586225001/
[https://perma.cc/S9NF-MW8M].
102. Shawn Kwan, Hong Kong Sets Record in $5 Billion Land Sale, BLOOMBERG
(Nov.
27,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-27/hong-kong-sets-record-in-5-billi
on-land-sale-to-sun-hung-kai [https://perma.cc/CF48-E9BH].
103. Id.
104. Gareth Davies et al., Revealed: The Thousands of Public Spaces Lost to the
HUFFINGTON
POST
(April
3,
2019),
Council
Funding
Crisis,
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/sold-from-under-you-investigation_uk_5c7be
e0fe4b0e5e313cb9eac [https://perma.cc/7XVP-CZYJ].
105. Fernanda G. Nicola & Sheila Foster, Comparative Urban Governance for
Lawyers, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 22–24 (2016).
106. Id. at 14, 23.
107. Miriam Axel-Lute, New Program Aims to Help Community Land Trusts Get
to Scale, SHELTERFORCE (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://shelterforce.org/2018/04/27/new-program-aims-to-help-community-land-trustsget-to-scale/ [https://perma.cc/3EEU-LLXK].
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interest share loans, given the lack of familiarity with these models.108
Cities, however, are not without solutions and tools to facilitate
community control of land or shared equity housing in disadvantaged
communities through their support of CLTS and LECs.
To address the financial barriers Co-City developments have faced,
we offer a menu of options that city leaders and community-based
entrepreneurs can use to make such developments more feasible.
These strategies are explored in turn, each strategy ending with an
example of how it can boost the goals of the Co-City Framework,
generally, and land stewardship tools like CLTs and LECs
specifically.
A. Zoning and Land Use Regulatory Incentives

Cities can incentivize the development of CLTs, LECs, and other
Co-City institutional mechanisms by incentivizing specific uses using
regulation.
Incentives can include allowances for mixed-use
development,109 parking lot reductions, investment into nearby public
transit, tax benefits, tax increment financing, fast-track review, social
impact bonds, inspection, and utility connection, fee waivers,
narrower street widths, and the like. These can make stewardship
approaches more financially attractive, enabling these developments
to access more financing from lenders.110 Ultimately, with incentives,
more permanently affordable units can be built.
As an example, take an incentive to increase the density of an area,
such as a density bonus. As part of an inclusionary zoning program,
for-profit developers are able to build more units, and add more
floors, when they meet local governments’ goals for more affordable
housing. Instead of allowing all developers to benefit from such
programs, cities can limit them to CLTs or LECs to ensure that more
permanently affordable housing units are built. Taking traditional
affordable housing development as an analogy, being able to build
more floors or more units on the same lot (by relaxing minimum unit
sizes), more residents can pool their resources together, access

108. Thaden, supra note 53.
109. Jena Tesse Fox, JLL Cites Mixed-Use Development for Profitability, HOTEL
MGMT.
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.hotelmanagement.net/development/jll-advises-mixed-use-development-f
or-profitability [https://perma.cc/AA3J-AWSA].
110. The Cost of Affordable Housing: Does It Pencil Out?, URBAN.ORG,
https://apps.urban.org/features/cost-of-affordable-housing/
[https://perma.cc/94HH-CS4D] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
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affordable units, and achieve economies of scale.111 As a result, such
a move would likely drastically increase the financial viability of
LECs.112
Cities that limit regulatory advantages to these kinds of equitable
developments exist around the world. Analogous efforts exist in
German cities, as discussed above.113 Munich, for instance, offers
special regulatory incentives to cooperative housing, regularly
favoring these cooperative developers and offering 20–40% discounts
on public land sales.114
Similarly, Boulder suspended a tax incentive for most developers,
except those that met public-service goals.115 The tax incentive — the
Qualified Opportunity Zones program116 — was designed to promote
investment in distressed areas.117 Concerned that the program would
not meet its intended goal to benefit residents directly, the city
suspended all applications for these tax benefits, except for projects
that would also directly benefit underserved residents. For instance,
it allowed the city-owned Boulder Junction project to continue, which
was a mixed-use development with significant affordable housing
built on top of a regional bus transit hub.118
The major drawback of these strategies is political feasibility.
Continuing with the example of density bonuses for affordable
housing, cities, regions, and recently “yes in my backyard” (or
YIMBY) advocates may want these to build more housing. But such
upzoning threatens existing homeowners, who want less density and
traffic that would arise from more density (also called “not in my
backyard,” or NIMBY, advocates).119 From the other end of the

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.

Reynolds, supra note 90.

Id.

Oscar Perry Abello, Boulder Presses Pause on Some Opportunity Zone
NEXT
CITY
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/boulder-presses-pause-on-some-opportunity-zone-dev
elopment [https://perma.cc/QWX3-J7PK].
116. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/K69C-X2Y7] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
117. Id.
118. Abello, supra note 115.
119. Steve Wright, Pros vs. Cons: Smart Growth Experts Debate Inclusionary
Zoning Strategies in an Effort to Win Diverse Affordable Neighborhoods, ON
COMMON
GROUND,
Winter
2007,
at
31,
https://www.nar.realtor/smart_growth.nsf/docfiles/winter07proscons.pdf/$FILE/winte
r07proscons.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4NC-ZT2F].
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housing spectrum, traditional housing affordability advocates also
may oppose upzoning because they fear that it would displace local
residents, often favoring expensive market- or luxury-rate housing.
Despite having some overlapping goals to build more housing,
YIMBY and traditional housing affordability advocates have sparred
on bills such as California’s proposal to upzone areas around
transit.120
In contrast, a targeted upzoning proposal like the type proposed
above may thus in fact be even more politically feasible than
traditional upzoning bills. As the YIMBYs prefer, the proposal
would favor upzoning and the creation of more housing units to
address the lack of supply. But to address concerns that upzoning
would displace local residents,121 targeted upzoning would limit these
benefits to developers who will steward the property, using CLTs and
LECs. These units would also be built affordably-by-design so that
each unit, albeit smaller, is more cost-effective, allowing more to
participate and pool their resources. Targeted upzoning may build
common ground between YIMBYs and traditional affordability
advocates.
The creation of new coalitions has been found to be key to housing
innovations. For instance, researchers point to a coalition of young
YIMBY advocates and racial justice organizers in sparking the end of
Coalitions
Minneapolis’ exclusionary, single-family zoning.122
between labor and tenant rights activists helped make Community
Benefit Agreements in the early 2000s a success.123 These agreements
require developers to provide affordable housing and local hiring to
the local community in exchange for community support of
megaprojects like Los Angeles’ L.A. Live.124

120. Jackie Fielder & Deepa Varma, SB 50 Authors Need to be Better Allies of
Tenants, Low-Income People and People of Color, S.F. EXAMINER (Dec. 31, 2019),

https://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/sb-50-authors-need-to-be-better-allies-of-tenant
s-low-income-people-and-people-of-color/ [https://perma.cc/G9Z4-CSY4].
121. Id.
122. Richard D. Kahlenberg, How Minneapolis Ended Single Family Zoning,
CENTURY
FOUND.
(Oct.
24,
2019),
https://tcf.org/content/report/minneapolis-ended-single-family-zoning/?session=1
[https://perma.cc/ALM4-8Y6V].
123. Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies in Effect,
PARTNERSHIP
FOR
WORKING
FAMS.,
https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/page/policy-tools-community-benefits-agreement
s-and-policies-effect [https://perma.cc/3KQ8-DUTG] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
124. Id.
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While more density raises gentrification concerns, favoring CLTs
and LECs blunts the threat.125 Potential appreciation and rising rents
serve properties stewarded for permanent affordability, and other
community amenity uses.126 CLTs and LECs can capture rising land
values and cycle them back into sustaining these land uses and
keeping them affordable and accessible.127 These tools, in fact,
promote what Majora Carter has called “self-gentrification,” a
contested idea but one that supports enabling longtime residents of
revitalizing neighborhoods to be in control of community
development and the kinds of amenities that address their needs.128
B. Alternative Financing Sources for Stewarded Developments

Stewarded developments can also consider alternative financing
sources that allow them to access more forms of capital. These
sources are likely willing to take lower returns in exchange for a
public good.
It is worth discussing why financing gaps in permanently affordable
housing development exist. Traditional lenders face regulatory or
operational roadblocks in financing projects seen as too risky or
unconventional.
For one, lenders rely on a process called
securitization129 to pool mortgages of a similar type and sell pieces of
that pool to investors. While this spreads credit risk, pooling requires
homogeneity in the underlying pooled assets — which is in tension
with the Co-City Framework’s aforementioned notion of pooling
resources.
Furthermore, capital market investors penalize
unstandardized assets, harming liquidity and exposing lenders to
higher risk.130
The sector of “entrepreneurial finance” seeks to address this gap
by helping entrepreneurs, such as developers, obtain financing from

125. Alana Semuels, Affordable Housing, Always, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/affordable-housing-always/3976
37/ [https://perma.cc/XUK5-NTAX].
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Dominic “CJ” Arenas, Don’t Move Improve: Self-Gentrification in the South
Bronx,
MEDIUM
(Feb.
13,
2018),
https://medium.com/@dominicarenas/dont-move-improve-self-gentrification-in-the-s
outh-bronx-f4056e9fb643 [https://perma.cc/S96H-V2EW].
129. Ian Galloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending and Community Development Finance,
21 COMMUNITY INVEST. 18, 19 (2009).
130. Laura Choi, Creating a Marketplace: Information Exchange and the
Secondary Market for Community Development Loans (Cmty. Dev. Invs. Ctr. at the
Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper 2007–01, 2007).
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lenders subject to fewer of the restrictions mentioned above for
unconventional projects.131 Crowdfunding is a relevant financing
mechanism for expensive projects due to its ability to pool the funds
from numerous individuals into one large project.132
Crowdfunding is a valuable tool for Oakland’s Permanent Real
Estate Cooperative (PREC). PREC describes itself as a “movement
cooperative.” It seeks not only to provide housing, but also to help
members transform their neighborhoods and systems of finance and
land ownership.133 In addition to using crowdfunding, PREC
combines features from both CLT and LECs, with a strong focus on
social movement organizing and participatory governance.134 About
25%135 of its $200,000 maintenance fund budget is covered by sales to
non-residents of cooperative shares, which return a dividend of 1.5%
to investors, far below the 7% commercial average.136 Investment
terms, furthermore, are structured to maintain the cooperative’s
mission. For instance, shares are non-transferable, cooperatives have
five years to buy back shares when investors need to sell, and
resident-owners get right of first refusal to acquire the cooperative’s
properties.137
Yet similar cooperative-like developments that use crowdfunding
will find that the amount of money they can raise is limited. Terms
like PREC’s may not be attractive for many retail investors, limiting
the pool of investors and ultimately funds that nontraditional,
nonprofit, or limited equity developers can raise. For low- or
middle-class non-resident investors, earning 1.5% on your investment
may be unsound. They likely will rather invest more of their portfolio

131. Garry Bruton et al., New Financial Alternatives in Seeding Entrepreneurship:
Microfinance, Crowdfunding, and Peer-to-Peer Innovations, 39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP

THEORY & PRAC. 9 (2015).
132. Id.
133. Permanent Real Estate Cooperatives, SUSTAINABLE ECONS. L. CTR.,
https://www.theselc.org/prec_pilot [https://perma.cc/47GK-GSCY] (last visited Mar.
22, 2020).
134. Id.
135. Jade Yamazaki Stewart, The East Bay Permanent Real Estate Cooperative’s
New Way to Build Housing Equity, OAKLAND MAG. (Oct. 2, 2019),
http://www.oaklandmagazine.com/October-2019/The-East-Bay-Permanent-Real-Esta
te-Cooperatives-New-Way-to-Build-Housing-Equity/
[https://perma.cc/MK59-QN3V].
136. Id.
137. Jared Brey, Why These Hospitals Have Promised $700 Million for Affordable
Housing
and
More,
NEXT
CITY
(Dec.
3,
2019),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/these-hospitals-have-promised-700-million-for-afforda
ble-housing-and-more [https://perma.cc/5AT6-3KPN].
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in high-interest savings or tax-advantaged retirement accounts that
deliver better returns with less risk, especially due to Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation insurance. Beyond that, investing much of
their portfolio in low-returning financial products like PREC’s shares
may harm these investors’ ability to save adequately for retirement or
rainy days, like medical emergencies.
To address some of these issues, online platforms to support
Co-City developments such as CLTs or LECs can help expand the
pool of investors for which these low-returning yet mission-oriented
financial products are attractive. In contrast to one-off sales of
cooperative stock, like PREC’s, a platform would aggregate many
Co-City projects in one place, filtered by a variety of key investment
criteria. These include size, geography, return, and measures of social
impact (for instance, the Community Development Financial
Institution, or CDFI, Assessment and Ratings System138).
For would-be Co-City developers, this platform would compile
potential financing sources.139 Eligibility filters and a standardized
application — which could double as a template to understand best
practices for legal, financial, and other operations — allow these
developers to source financing more quickly. Several housing
platforms like Cobuy140 and UsurpPower141 ease these transaction
costs for specific markets, such as shared mortgages and energy

138. ELISE BALBONI & CHRISTINA TRAVERS, LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP.,
CDFIS
&
IMPACT
INVESTING:
AN
INDUSTRY
REVIEW
(2017)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/outreach-and-education/2017/CDFI
s-Impact-Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/869J-8JJ6].
139. To provide a flavor of the diversity of financial sources that exist, see MARC
NORMAN, ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING AFFORDABLE
HOUSING
ON
UNDER-UTILIZED
CITY-OWNED
PROPERTY
(2019),
https://a2gov.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=7863583&GUID=739FCFD2-50C5-4
475-8547-5EE2868C75A3. As Professor Norman’s analysis shows, these sources may
include credit unions, nonprofits, CDFIs, cooperative associations, social purpose
real estate investment funds, insurance companies, city and federal funds, hospitals
that need to invest community benefits dollars to maintain nonprofit status, social
impact bond creators, and social impact real estate investment trusts, like the
Housing Partnership Equity Trust. See, e.g., id.; Kathryn Reynolds et al., Why
Hospitals and Health Systems Are Becoming Impact Investors, URB. INST. (Aug. 8,
2019),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/why-hospitals-and-health-systems-are-b
ecoming-impact-investors [https://perma.cc/3UCJ-LFKS].
140. Nat Levy, Buy a House with a Buddy? This Startup Aims to Simplify
Non-Traditional Home-Buying Partnerships, GEEKWIRE (Nov. 25, 2016)
https://www.geekwire.com/2016/cobuy-aims-simplify-non-traditional-home-buying-pa
rtnerships-skyrocketing-prices-send-buyers-scrambling-alternatives/
[https://perma.cc/N45H-4D3N].
141. UNETY, https://usurppower.com/ [https://perma.cc/N6JM-UVMT] (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020).
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retrofits, respectively. Demand for such a way to navigate numerous
financing opportunities is clear. Organizations from the Global Fund
for Cities’ Development142 to Grounded Solutions143 have created
databases of possible funding sources for Co-City-type developments,
like CLT and LECs.
Specific types of institutional investors may be attracted to such
platforms because of the search and information costs of finding
worthwhile investments. CRA-motivated banks, for instance, need to
invest in low- and moderate-income (LMI) geographies or find loans
originated by certified community development lenders, such as
community development financial institutions. Currently, due to
search and information costs, many banks simply invest in mutual
funds of loans that service their LMI geographies to meet their
obligation, despite the costly nature of the convenience.144 Other
smaller institutional investors, such as municipal pension funds,
foundations, and high-income individuals, will also benefit from a
platform in which they can easily find investments that meet their
investment and impact criteria.145
There is precedent for raising financing through platforms to fund
stewarded developments, such as the platform Faithify’s offering of
the Lucy Stone Cooperative.146 Faithify raised $11,358 in donations
in two months to help the Lucy Stone Cooperative (LSC) afford a
down payment.147 While LSC is a group-equity cooperative, LSC
members do not accrue individual equity to keep rent permanently
In that way, it is a stewardship rather than
affordable.148

142. FMDV, INTERREG NORTH-WEST EUROPE, MAPPING FINANCE FOR
COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS IN THE NORTHWEST EUROPEAN REGION (2018),
http://admin.fmdv.net/Images/Publications/113/FINAL-CLTFinance_Mapping_Synth
esisdoc_181008.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2XX-FJZ6].
143. Accessing Mortgage Financing Options for Buyers of Shared Equity Homes,
GROUNDED
SOLUTIONS
NETWORK,
https://groundedsolutions.org/tools-for-success/resource-library/mortgage-financing-o
ptions [https://perma.cc/5D5Z-JG8P] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
144. Galloway, supra note 29.
145. Id.
146. UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST COMMUNITY COOPERATIVES: LUCY STONE
COOPERATIVE, https://uucommunitycoops.org/lsc/ [https://perma.cc/D9BF-59KV]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
147. The
(Next)
Lucy
Stone
Cooperative!,
FAITHIFY,
https://faithify.org/archived-projects/the-next-lucy-stone-cooperative/ (last visited
April 29, 2020).
148. See
generally
Housing
Co-op
Equity
Models,
NASCO,
https://www.nasco.coop/development/handbook/equity [https://perma.cc/7JJ7-YP8F]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
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ownership-based governance system, like LECs.149 Furthermore, to
assist philanthropists, projects on Faithify can be filtered by type of
project and feature clear descriptions of key criteria.150 Other
crowdfunding platforms for mission-driven real estate-related
investments include Nico, which reduces the barriers to entry for local
neighbors and renters to invest in real estate in their neighborhood,151
Small Change, which allows users to filter by the development’s level
of social impact,152 and BlocPower, which focuses on energy
retrofits.153
C. Strategic Partnerships and Investments

While the Co-City Framework explicitly considers both CLTs and
LECs as key pooling mechanisms, when these two forms work
together, they can unlock more financial opportunities. For one,
LECs allow residents to pool resources to drive down costs and also
secure a blanket mortgage,154 using a physical building as collateral.
R50, one “building group” (or baugruppen) in Austria, for
instance, has been able to live in units nearly 20% cheaper155 than
comparable units. Because the group self-directed the development
of its own building, it avoided having to hire a developer, which
would otherwise require a 10–20%156 return on investment on top of
the cost of the building. Furthermore, by organizing a community to
live in the building, the baugruppen also avoided marketing and sales
costs, which can consume up to 10% of total development budgets.157
Finally, this baugruppen was able to obtain more financing for its

149. Id.
150. See generally supra note 147.
151. See Adele Peters, Now Renters Can Also Make Money in the Real Estate
Market as Their Neighborhoods Gentrify, FAST CO. (Nov. 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90432402/now-renters-can-also-make-money-in-the-re
al-estate-market-as-the-neighborhoods-gentrify [https://perma.cc/EYY7-2H2H].
152. See
SMALL
CHANGE,
https://www.smallchange.com/
[https://perma.cc/KK83-C72E] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
153. See
BLOCPOWER,
https://marketplace.blocpower.io/
[https://perma.cc/XX75-NTRL] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
154. Ehlenz, supra note 56, at 8.
155. Jessica Bridger, Don’t Call It A Commune: Inside Berlin’s Radical Cohousing
Project,
METROPOLIS
(June
10,
2015),
https://www.metropolismag.com/architecture/residential-architecture/dont-call-it-a-co
mmune-inside-berlin-radical-cohousing-project/ [https://perma.cc/5D8Q-9RDL].
What
A
Building
Costs,
HJ
DEV.,
156. Lauren
Elkies,
https://therealdeal.com/wp-content/uploads/all/images/37700/What_a_building_costs.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5SW9-SS9Q] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
157. See id.

936

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

building by pooling together initial down payments and proving its
interest in the project to lenders.158
R50 would also benefit from a partnership with a CLT. By
separating the ownership of land from the building, the cost to own an
interest in a cooperative is lowered, as a cooperative resident does not
Finally, both the
need as much money to purchase land.159
cooperative and land trust form offer distinct financial benefits that
can be pooled together. Cooperative corporations have an enhanced
ability to take multiple forms of capital, unlike trusts, which are
typically 501(c)(3)s.160 Yet, since 501(c)(3)s often qualify for special
tax exemptions,161 which can thus reduce the partnership’s total
operational costs and financial viability.
Other strategic partnerships Co-City developers should consider
are those with traditional community development corporations
(CDCs). There are quite a few benefits for both parties, as evidenced
by the Banana Kelly CDC’s partnership with the East Harlem
CLT.162 First, some CDCs have considered ways to move their rental
portfolios into land trusts to maintain permanent affordability. “For
example, the Banana Kelly Community Improvement Association is
developing a land trust to govern their properties while mobilizing
broader community support for creating additional land trusts in the
Bronx area of New York City.”163 By holding these rental portfolios
in a land trust, CLTs can have the “minimum income to allow
financing to work,” notes Banana Kelly’s executive director, Harold
DeRienzo.164
Some CDCs are part of large housing portfolios, which can create
an unprecedented scale for CLTs. One example is the Joint
Ownership Entity (JOE), of which the Banana Kelly CDC is a part,

158. Bridger, supra note 155.
159. Lillian M. Ortiz, Will Limited-Equity Cooperatives Make a Comeback?,
(Apr.
25,
2017),
SHELTERFORCE
https://shelterforce.org/2017/04/25/will-limited-equity-co-ops-make-comeback/
[https://perma.cc/GP8S-P4ZD].
160. Permanent Real Estate Cooperatives, SUSTAINABLE ECONS. L. CTR.,
https://www.theselc.org/prec_pilot [https://perma.cc/2FZ7-JGFA] (last visited May 4,
2020).
161. Ortiz, supra note 159.
162. DAVID M. GREENBERG, LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., COMMUNITY
LAND
TRUSTS
&
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(2019),
https://www.lisc.org/media/filer_public/f0/e0/f0e07be0-1ca5-4720-b78c-3a0d7a0181dd/
022519_white_paper_community_land_trusts.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FZ7-JGFA].
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which holds nearly 3000 affordable units.165 The JOE allows CDCs to
assign ownership interests in their property to an umbrella entity, and
receive membership interest and board seats. The JOE, in turn,
manages the assets and provides more consistent revenues and a
larger balance sheet for future development projects.166
Given that one of the core principles of the Co-City Framework is
pooling, there is a lot to be learned from how real estate investment
cooperatives (REICs) allow local residents to invest financially to
collectively buy, rehab, and manage commercial and residential
property in the community.167 Strategic, pooled investments allow
these entities to raise capital and investment assets as collateral to
purchase more properties.
The Northeast Investment Cooperative (NEIC) in Minneapolis
provides an example.168 In 2012, residents pooled their money to
acquire a discount mattress warehouse as a group, which has now
been converted into a thriving bike repair shop, craft beer brewery,
and bakery. When a building owner agrees to sell, NEIC signs a
letter of intent with that owner, raises financing from new and
existing members, and also obtains capital from a community bank.
A key aspect of loan analysis is that the borrower has sufficient equity
and assets to cover the down payment and associated renovations.169
Due to the collection of thriving assets it has developed, NEIC has

165. Oscar Perry Abello, Nonprofits Join Up to Increase Affordable Housing Heft,
NEXT
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(Mar.
29,
2017),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/nyc-joe-affordable-housing-investment-lihtcs
[https://perma.cc/M9SZ-9SWM].
166.
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for a bunch of smaller loans they might not be able to afford. Other
buildings in the portfolio that don’t need maintenance serve as collateral or
assurance to a lender, which can lower the interest rate even more. In real
estate parlance, this musical chairs game of using a portfolio of buildings to
get financing for maintenance needs is known as “asset management.”
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[https://perma.cc/HUX9-GDJB] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
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(Feb.
23,
2015),
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[https://perma.cc/8NVJ-VMQJ].
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successfully obtained financing for multiple buildings from local
banks.170
Similar work has been proposed and prototyped by Cooperative
Community Investment (CCI)171 and the cooperative housing
association Mietshauser Syndikat.172 As CCI explains, assets the
REIC collects can be used to provide “dividends from income
generated through commercial rents, strategic acquisitions or
proceeds from CCI sales” and create larger purchases that reduce the
cost of basic needs, like food and utilities.173
Ultimately, by encouraging the use of regulatory incentives to
promote more pooling and affordability-by-design, alternative
financing sources, and strategic partnerships, city leaders and
community-based entrepreneurs can scale stewarded developments
even in areas with high land values.
CONCLUSION

A key component of the Co-City Framework is the creation of
common goods collectively governed and controlled by the
communities that they serve. These goods are made possible by local
policies that allow residents to access and utilize the property of the
city, that we all share, and through the pooling of resources, money,
and time to develop or construct those goods.
This Essay investigated one city’s policy — the Large Lots Program
— as an example of the kind of program that can be adapted or
redesigned with stewardship in mind. The piece then explored why
Co-City’s applicability does not end with the Chicago example. It has
relevance to a variety of public land sales happening across the world.
Yet the Co-City Framework will have trouble applying to areas
where land is cost-prohibitive.174 In these cities, governments often
sell land in order to generate revenue — not just revitalize

170. See Oscar Perry Abello, These Neighbors Got Tired of Waiting for
Traditional
Developers,
NEXT
CITY
(Aug.
30,
2016),

https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/cooperative-commercial-real-estate-development-min
neapolis [https://perma.cc/ZCB6-WNJW].
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Norman,
COOPERATIVE
COMMUNITY,
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https://syrdevelopment.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/cooperativecommunityinc_norm
an.pdf [https://perma.cc/H72K-L96H] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
172. See
MIETSHÄUSER
SYNDIKAT,
https://www.syndikat.org/en/
[https://perma.cc/D4SE-U955] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
173. Norman, supra note 171.
174. Axel-Lute, supra note 107.
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neighborhoods.175 In order to push the Co-City Framework further,
this Essay ended with an investigation into three general strategies
Co-City projects can use to support and finance their work. These
include creating incentives in zoning and land use laws, encouraging
the identification of alternative financing sources, and launching
strategic partnerships to build leverageable assets.
Beyond these strategies, it is worth briefly discussing legal reforms
or policies that can further enable the Co-City Framework to become
a powerful intervention into exclusionary patterns of urban
development. Following Minnesota’s lead, states might consider
securities exemptions that allow cooperatives to raise capital from
their members and exceed the purchase of membership shares.176
Rules like this helped Minnesota’s thriving cooperative sector.177 The
PREC in California, too, was able to raise more money from its
surrounding community due to a 2015 state law allowing cooperatives
to raise more than $350 from their members.178
While a focus on finance seems at odds from the community-driven
efforts seen in Co-City developments, they go hand-in-hand. Many of
the accounts above, from PREC to the NEIC, show that efforts to
build financial feasibility involve community organizing so that local
residents can increase community control over their neighborhood.
Raising financing means listening to the concerns and needs of a
variety of local stakeholders who are invested in the outcome of the
project. Raising financing means coalition-buildings work with
community development corporations and other diverse actors in the
ecosystem, such as policymakers, to push for new policies. Raising
financing is itself a means to understand and partner with
communities to build more equitable and empowering communities.

175. See Gareth Davies et al., Revealed: The Thousands of Public Spaces Lost to
Council Funding Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2019),
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